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TAXATION PRIVILEGE TA..-..:: ON FOREIGN CORPORATIONS DUE
PROCESS AND COMMERCE CLAUSES - VALIDITY OF FoRMULA - The state
of Texas levied an annual franchise tax on all corporations, both foreign and
domestic, authorized to do business within the state.1 The tax was assessed on
tl1e basis of the amount of the total capital stock which was allocable to Texas,
the allocation being based on the proportion that Texas gross receipts bore to
total gross receipts. This formula, as applied to the Ford Motor Company, gave
the statutory base of $23,000,000 on which Ford paid the tax under protest.2

I.Tex. Civ. Stat. Rev. Ann. (Vernon, 1939), art. 7084. The ta."<: ,vas sustained
in Southern Realty Corp. v. McC:tllum, (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) 65 F. (2d) 934;
Investment Securities Co. v. Meharg, IIS Tex. 441, 282 S. W. 802 (1926).
2 (Texas gross receipts) $ 34,000,000
{Taxable Base) X
(Total gross receipts) $888,000,000
(Total Capital) $600,000,000.
X=$23,ooo,ooo.
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The evidence showed that the Ford Motor Company had only an assembly
plant in Texas worth $3,000,000, that auto parts were ~hipped in, assembled,
and sold in intrastate commerce. The circuit court of appeals affirmed the district court's judgment upholding the tax against the claim that it burdened
interstate commerce and taxed property outside the state. On certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the United States, held, the formula was constitutional
because it fairly measured the value added to the privilege of doing intrastate
business by use of property outside the state. Judgment affirmed. Justices Black
and Douglas concurred in the result. Justice McReynolds dissented. Ford Motor
Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331, 60 S. Ct. 273 (1939).
This case seems to be predicated on the broad premise that a tax may be
imposed for the privilege of engaging in intrastate commerce if the privilege
is equal to the tax. By placing the case on that ground the Court avoided some
of the difficult inquiries that ordinarily arise under the unit rule. It may be that
this case, along with GreafJ Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean,3 shows a
disposition on the part of the Court to sustain a reasonable privilege tax without
inquiring whether it meets the tests laid down by the courts in the cases following Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas,4' In the Western Union case
the plaintiff was engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce in the state
of Kansas, which sought to impose an annual tax upon the whole capital stock
of the company in return for the privilege of continuing to engage in the
intrastate business. While the Court denied the validity of the tax clearly on the
ground that it burdened interstate commerce, it was not entirely clear whether
any tax of the size imposed would have been deemed a burden on the interstate
business, or whether the tax burdened interstate commerce because it taxed
property outside the jurisdiction of Kansas. 5 But it seems to have been assumed in
the later cases that the· fault was in measuring the tax on extra-state values.
Certainly when the states measured their taxes on the capital stock attributable
to local property only { calculated by a unit rule) the taxes were upheld as
3

·301 U.S. 412, 57 S. Ct. 77z (1937). This case sustained an occupation tax
levied by the state of Louisiana on retail grocery stores in the state, the amount of
the tax on each establishment being measured by the total number of such establishments owned by the taxpayer, whether such establishments were located within or
outside Louisiana.
~ z16 U. S. 1; 30 S. Ct. 190 (1910); Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 56,
30 S. Ct. 23z (1910); Ludwig v. Western Union Telegraph Co., z16 U. S. 146, 30
S. Ct. 280 (1910).
GWestern Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, at 31-32, 30 S. Ct. 190
(1910): "So, in the case now before us, the exaction, as a condition of the privilege
of continuing to do or doing local business in Kansas, that the Telegraph Company
shall pay a giuen per cent of its authorized capital stock, is, for every practical purpooe, a
tax both on the company's local business in Kansas, and on its interstate business, or on
the privilege of doing interstate business••••" (Italics used by the court.) Again,
z16 U. S. at 30, the Court said: "That fee, plainly, is not based on such of the company's capital stock as represented in its local business and property in Kansas. The
requirement is a given per cent of the company's authorized capital, that is, all its
capital, wherever or however employed, whether in the United States or in foreign
countries, and whateYer may be the extent of its lines in Kansas as compared with
its lines outside of that State."
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property taxes. 6 This left the following situation: (I) if the tax burdened interstate commerce, it might be sustained as a property tax if the measure did not
include extraterritorial values; ( 2) if the tax did not burden interstate commerce, it was valid if (a) the subject of the tax was within the jurisdiction of
the state and (b) the measure of the tax was proper.7 In order to decide the
principal case .the Court might have gone no further than to place it in the
first or second category, and then to decide whether the measure of the tax
included extra-state values. Rather than open up the question whether the
formula properly allocated property, tangible and intangible, to Texas,8 the
Court relied on three cases which went much further and sustained taxes
measured by extra-state values. 9 The .first two of these cases are not strictly in
point. The Botkin case relied strongly on Baltic Mining Co. 'll. Massachusetts,10
in which the Court said that a state tax on the whole capital stock of an interSt. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350, 35 S. Ct. 99 (1914).
See 51 HARV. L. R:ev. 508 (1938).
8
When the validity of the tax in the principal case was sustained by the circuit
court of appeals, that court stated that the formula was a proper allocation of the
property to Texas. Southern Realty Corp. v. McCallnm, (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) 65
F. (2d) 934- The court said: "When the corporation is to do business in other states
also, avoidance of a trespass on interstate commerce or on that done beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of the taxing state is secured by apportioning the business potency
of the corporation represented by its business capital according to the business actually
done during the preceding calendar year in the taxing state as indicated by gross
receipts, compared with all its business everywhere." 65 F. (2d) at 936. The court
cited three cases in support of its statement: International Shoe Co. v. Shartel, 279
U.S. 429, 49 S. Ct. 380 (1928); National Leather Co. v. Massachusetts, 277 U. S.
413, 48 S. Ct. 534 (1928); and Western Cartridge Co. v. Emmerson, 281 U. S.
SII, 50 S. Ct. 383 (1930). The first two of these cases involved taxes where the
formula measured the tax by the proportion of local prop.erty, not gross receipts, to
total property. The Emmerson case involved a tax on capital stock but measured by a
combination of local business and property to total business and property. There are
cases in which the proportion of local gross receipts to total gross receipts have been
held to be a proper measure of the local business, but the incidence of the tax was on
local net income, not local property. None of these cases is quite like the Ford case.
11 Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. R. v. Botkin, 240 U. S. 227, 36 S. Ct. 261
(1916); Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia, 302 U.S. 22, 58 S. Ct. 75 (1937); Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412, 57 S. Ct. 772 (1937).
10 231 U. S. 68, 34 S. Ct. IS (1913). A corporate excise tax which is measured
by authorized capital of such corporations, but limited to a specified snm ($2000),
was not deemed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. The tax involved
in the Botkin case, Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. R. v. Botkin, 240 U. S. 227, 36 S. Ct.
261 (1916), was also levied directly on the entire capital stock, and had a specified
maximum of $2500. Much of the property represented by the capital was outside
the taxing state. The Court referred to and relied on the Baltic case, saying, 240 U. S.
at 235: "It was because the tax, although measured by authorized capital stock, could
not in view of its limitations be regarded as imposing a direct burden upon interstate
commerce that the tax was upheld." On the same page, referring to the identical type
of tax in the case at bar the Court said: "We find no ground for saying that a tax
of this character, thuI Umited, is in any sense a tax imposed on interstate commerce."
(Italics inserted by the writer.)
6
7
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state corporation was not burdensome because a maximum was set by the
statute. However:, the Baltic Mining case was overruled 11. after the Botkin case
and it would seem that both cases are discredited in so far as they stand for the
proposition that the existence of a maximum may prevent a tax measured partially by interstate commerce from being a burden on it. If the Botkin case still
stands it must be on the ground that the tax was levied on a domestic corporation
and not a. foreign one. The Atlantic Refining case also involved a franchise tax
measured by total capital stock, but was upheld on the ground that the corporation was being excluded, not evicted from the state. One can only speculate
why the Court relied on cases which would have supported the tax even though
it had been measured by extra-state property. The tax might have been sustained
on narrower grounds. Apparently the Court has returned to the position expressed by Holmes' dissent Jn the Western Union case, with the qualification that
the state's tax on the privilege must be reasonable in view of the privilege
granted.
lames W. Deer

11

Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U. S. 460, 49 S. Ct. 204 (1929);

Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203, 45 S. Ct. 477 (1925).

